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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to extend current theories in crisis communication, by
developing a more systemic approach to understanding the role of emotions in crises and the strategies
organizations can use to respond. The authors’ integrated crisis mapping (ICM) model is premised on a
public-based, emotion-driven perspective where different crises are mapped on two continua, the
organization’s engagement in the crisis and primary public’s coping strategy.
Design/methodology/approach – Content analysis was used to analyze 259 stories in US
mainstream newspaper covering five different crisis cases.
Findings – The initial test suggests theoretical rigor. It found that publics involved in crises
pertaining to reputational damage, technological breakdown, industrial matters, labor unrest, and
regulation/legislation, are likely to feel anxious, angry, and sad. At the same time, they are likely to
engage in conative coping.
Originality/value – Understanding publics’ emotions in crisis is a rarely studied area. This model is
arguably the first to suggest a framework of emotions. This study is the first of a series of tests to
generate what Yin termed “analytic generalization” for the ICM model.
Keywords Corporate communications, Communication management, Emotional intelligence,
Public relations, United States of America
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
How to shape the appropriate strategies in response to a crisis is critical for any given
organization and public relations (PR) practitioner working in the field of crisis
communication. Given that the goals of crisis communication, defined as the “ongoing
dialogue between the organization and its publics” prior to, during, and after the crisis
(Fearn-Banks, 2002, p. 2), are to restore organizational normalcy, influence public
perception, and regain and repair image and reputation, strategies used should be
“designed to minimize damage to the image of the organization”. Lukaszweski (1997, p. 8)
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argued that the strategic management of message response in crisis communication is a
“fundamental communication principle”. Designing sound strategic communications
and tactics to communicate crisis so as to minimize damage to the image of the
organization has been described as a paramount responsibility (Stocker, 1997). Grunig
(2001) articulated four principles (relationship, accountability, disclosure, and
symmetrical communication) of crisis communications, which highlight the important
role PR plays in crisis situations. While most of these strategies are often characterized
as direct responses to the crisis (Cowden and Sellnow, 2002; Fearn-Banks, 2002; Fink,
1986; Harrison, 1999; Massey, 2001; Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992; Seeger and Ulmer, 2002;
Ulmer, 2001), Ray (1999, p. 20) argued that strategies would either:
. deny the crisis exists;
. provide “partial, inaccurate, or delayed information”; or
. maintain an open communication channels with constituents.
Arguably, the two dominant theories on crisis strategies, Benoit’s (Benoit, 1995, 1997,
2004; Benoit and Brinson, 1994; Brinson and Benoit, 1999) image repair strategies and
Coombs’ (1995, 1998, 2007) situational crisis communication strategies, are designed to
understand what strategies are relevant to use under what circumstances. These often
stem from a situation-based response to crisis. The image repair theory is appropriate to
be used when the situation leads to a loss of face. When face is threatened, face works is
used to repair image, argued Benoit and Brinson (1994). This usually occurs when the
accused is believed to have committed an offensive act by its salient audience (Benoit,
2004). Coombs’ (1998) strategies are positioned according to the situation based on the
types of crises and the organization’s locus of control. On one hand, when the organization
is deemed to have strong personal control over the crisis, more accommodative strategies
like full apology are recommended for use. On the other hand, when the organization has
weak control over the crisis, more defensive strategies like attack and denial are
recommended.
While, these situation-based crisis responses serve as vital roadmaps to understand
the crisis situation, it is argued that a more universal and systemic approach would be to
shape crisis responses from an emotion-based perspective: to understand what are the
emotional upheavals that the public involved in the crisis are likely to experience so that
organizations can streamline their strategies to address their specific needs. Previous
studies have found that the perception of a crisis, particularly from a given public, is not
strictly a function of an environmental stimulus itself, but involves an interpretation of
the stimulus (Carver and Blaney, 1977). Emotion is argued to be a critical stimulus.
Lazarus (1991, p. 38) defined emotion as “organized cognitive-motivational-relational
configurations whose status changes with changes in the person-environment
relationship as this is perceived and evaluated (appraisal)”. In a crisis, as the conflict
between the public and the organization escalates, emotions are one of the anchors in the
publics’ interpretation of what is unfolding, changing, and shaping. Earlier emotion
related crisis communication research focused on the impact of general positive and
negative affective states on decision processes. For example, Coombs and Holladay
(2005) proposed that crisis responsibility is related to the affect created by a crisis:
stronger perceptions of crisis responsibility should strengthen the negative affect
while lower perceptions of crisis responsibility should be related to positive affect.
Coombs and Holladay (2005) also identified three emotions from attribution theory
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particularly salient to crisis management: sympathy, anger, and schadenfreude (taking
joy from the pain of the organization).
Jin et al. (2007) have developed a new conceptualization called the integrated crisis
mapping model (ICM) aimed at understanding the diverse and varied emotions likely
to be experienced by the key stakeholders in crises. Dominant emotions in the ICM
model, developed from integrating works from psychology and crises literature, are
extrapolated on two continua. On the X-axis is the publics’ coping strategy (from
cognitive to conative coping), which consists of the primary public’s cognitive and
behavioral efforts to manage specific external or internal demands and on the Y-axis is
the level of organizational engagement (from high to low)[1]. Different types of crises,
drawn from the crisis literature, are mapped into each of the four quadrants, with the
dominant and secondary emotions posited. As an initial attempt to test the theoretical
robustness and ecological validity of the ICM model, this study examines five crises
posited in the first quadrant hypothesized to require the publics’ conative coping and
high organizational engagement, where the primary emotion identified is anger,
followed by anxiety. These cases are studied for their instrumental value rather than
intrinsic value.
This study is significant on four fronts. First, we attempt to understand how an
organization and its primary public appraise a crisis; second, how different organizational
engagement levels and public coping strategies can lead to different positioning on the
crisis map driven by the primary emotion conjured in the primary public; and third, how
different crisis mapping can impact organizational responses. Four, and more
significantly, this represents our initial attempt to build a new theoretical framework.
Saunders (2004, p. 140) argued that applying theory to real life situations is “useful
towards theory building” because such situations “provide observations grounded in
actual organizational efforts aimed at solving actual organizational problems”. Five cases
of the same phenomenon were explored in order to construct a more robust study
(Yin, 1993). This study represents the first of subsequent empirical tests to understand the
theoretical and practical rigors of our ICM model. Through the building of this model, it is
the authors’ goal to advance our current understanding in crisis communication and
offers practical insights to scholars and practitioners on how they can understand, with
greater preciseness, the emotional upheavals their primary public are likely to experience
so that they can shape the appropriate crisis responses and tools to manage the crisis with
optimal effectiveness.
2. Theoretical framework: ICM model
2.1 Public responses based on key emotions
Public are a “group of people who face a common issue” (Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt,
1996, p. 84). Grunig’s situational theory of public stated that the general public can be
segmented into different categories of public based on their communication behavior.
Three independent variables, i.e. problem recognition, constraint recognition, and level
of involvement, are proposed to be capable of predicting why and when people are
likely to communicate Grunig (1997). In a crisis, the public have been defined
differently, according to their importance to resolving situation (Lukaszweski, 1997),
their functional roles (Dougherty, 1992), and their long-term influences (Ulmer, 2001).
Based on previous literature, we propose that in crisis situations the primary public
comprise the following characteristics:
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. they are most affected by the crisis at the levels of cognition, emotion, and behavior;
. they have shared common interests, and destiny, in seeing the crisis resolved; and
. they have long-term interests, and influences, on the organization’s reputation
and operation.
However, there is a lack of a crisis-specific and systematic approach to understanding
crisis-public identification and segmentation as a reflection of the complex nature of
crisis situations, the crisis-derived constraints and the upheavals of emotions in crises.
For example, the central concept of situational theory, level of involvement, was
defined as the extent people attach themselves to a situation (Grunig and Hunt, 1984),
which occurs as a function of prior knowledge or relevance/salience/importance. It has
been clearly placed as an antecedent condition to interest and arousal (Grunig, 1969,
1978, 1988), which is more cognitive in nature as a judgment and is not directly related
to the emotional process itself. To move beyond sole focus on cognitive perceptions of
public in crisis, we proposed to examine the realm of emotions and affective impacts on
various public in a spectrum of crisis situations.
Emotion researchers have studied human emotions from diverse points of view,
such as bio-information, arousal of activation, and cognitive appraisal, with empirical
evidence of emotional effects on memory, evaluation, judgment, information
processing, as well as behavior and relationship (Bless, 2000; Booth-Butterfield and
Booth-Butterfield, 1990; Cacioppo and Petty, 1989; Lazarus, 1982, 1991; Murry and
Dacin, 1995; Rusting, 1998; Tiedens and Linton, 2001). Cognitive appraisal of emotions is
one of the most well-established and well-applied emotion research streams in emotion
research. Lazarus (1991, p. 38), the main contributor to the integrated cognitive-based
emotion research stream, defined emotion as “organized cognitive-motivational-
relational configurations whose status changes with changes in the person-environment
relationship as this is perceived and evaluated (appraisal)”. According to Lazarus,
emotion is a mental state of readiness as response to the appraisal of the environment
and one’s own thoughts. Emotion can be generated by stimuli at present, in retrospection
or in anticipation, as a result of cognitive effort or evaluative judgment of the relevance of
the stimuli. Specifically, “appraisal” is the judgment or evaluation based on the
cognitive-based goals at the given situation, and “relevance” refers to the relationship
between the episode/event to the person’s own well-being. Without appraisal, there is no
emotion.
Consequently, research has found that people make judgments and decisions by
inspecting their feelings and interpreting what these feelings mean for the issue at
hand. Their perception of a crisis is not strictly a function of an environmental stimulus
itself, but involves an interpretation of the crisis situations (Carver and Blaney, 1977).
According to risk-as-feeling hypothesis, emotional reactions to risks can diverge from
cognitive evaluations of the same risks. Applying the cognitive appraisal perspective
in crisis communication, Jin et al. (2007) have developed a theoretical framework to
understand the primary publics’ crisis responses, as evidenced by the predominant
emotion elicited by different types of crises. Four negative emotions (anger, fright,
anxiety, and sadness) are identified as the dominant emotions that are most likely to be
experienced by the public in crisis situations.
2.1.1 Anger. The core relational theme underlying anger is a demanding offense
against “me” and “mine” (Lazarus, 1991). In crisis situation, the primary public tend to
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experience anger when facing a demanding offense from certain organization against
them or their well-being. The ego-involvement of the public is engaged to preserve or
enhance their identity or benefit in the situation. There is usually an issue of blaming that
derives from the knowledge that the organization is accountable for the harmful actions
and they could have been controlled or even prevented by the organization. The primary
public might potentially favor attack as the strategy in facing the organization. At the
stance and strategy levels, though sometimes the public may appear cooperative, anger
can be expressed indirectly in passively aggressive tactics. Reports of felt anger were
found to increase as perceptions of crisis responsibilities intensify (Coombs and
Holladay, 2005).
2.1.2 Fright. The core relational theme underneath fright is facing uncertain and
existential threat (Lazarus, 1991). The public is not certain about how to cope with the
loss as well as how the engaged organization may handle this situation. Depending on
their resource and power, they may choose avoidance or escape from the crisis as a
viable recourse.
2.1.3 Anxiety. By definition, anxiety stems from the core relational theme as facing an
immediate, concrete, and overwhelming danger (Lazarus, 1991). The public may feel
overwhelmed by the crisis situation and look for the immediate solutions. Their
ego-involvement is evidenced as the effort to protect their own ego-identity against the
organization whom they perceive to be the direct source of existential threat. They might
blame or not blame the organization depending on their environment assessment. Given
the uncertainty of how to cope with the situation and what the organization might react,
they tend to avoid and escape.
2.1.4 Sadness. Having experienced an irrevocable loss is the core relational theme of
the emotion of sadness (Lazarus, 1991). Here, the public suffers from tangible or
intangible loss or both. Their goal of survival is threatened and this loss of any type of
ego-involvement (e.g. esteem, moral values, ideal, people, and their well-being) caused
by circumstances beyond their control may lead them in desperate need for relief and
comfort. If they perceive the loss can be restored or compensated for, their sadness may
not occur or will be associated with hope. The action tendency of the public might well
depend on what measures the organization may take.
Another key concept in appraisal model of emotion is the different levels of emotions
felt at a given time towards a given stimulus. The primary level emotion is the one the
public experiences at the first, or immediate, instance. The secondary level emotion is one
the public experiences in subsequent instances, as time goes by, and contingent upon the
organization’s responses to the crisis. The secondary level emotion may be transferred
from the dominant emotion or coexisting with the primary level. In this study, we focus on
the quadrant with anger as the primary emotion and anxiety as the secondary emotion
(Quadrant 1) as conjured by crises in reputational damage, technological breakdown,
industrial crisis, labor unrest/protest, and regulation/legislation.
2.2 Operationalization of the ICM model
As Figure 1 shows, the ICM model is indicated by a crisis matrix based on two axes: the
analysis of the organizational engagement level in the crisis that can be examined through
a scale of high and low engagement, and the primary public’s coping strategy from
conative coping to cognitive coping. It is argued that for effective crisis management, the
organization, at varied engagement levels in different issues, must understand the
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primary publics’ emotional demands so as to communicate accordingly and align with the
coping strategy needed by the primary public (Jin et al., 2007).
On the X-axis is the public’s coping strategy. Coping is the vital concept in appraisal
theory of emotions. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) proposed two types of coping:
(1) Problem-focused coping (an attempt to manipulate the environment to reduce
stress), which involves efforts to modify the problem at hand and typically
includes elements such as generating options to solve the problem, evaluating
pros and cons of different options, and implementing steps to solve the problem.
(2) Emotion-focused (re-appraisal of the environment stimuli), which is defined as
aiming to manage the emotional distress that is associated with the situation.
Emotion-focused strategies range from denial, venting of emotions, positive
interpretation of events, to seeking out social support (Baker and Berenbaum,
2007).
Adapting the cognitive appraisal framework of coping in crisis situations, we posit:
(1) Cognative coping as the public trying to manage the situation so as to alter a
troubled relationship or to sustain a desirable one by taking actions or at least
show their tendency of action, which corresponds to Lazarus’ concept of problem-
focused coping, aiming at changing the actual relationship between the public
and the organization via actual measures and steps.
(2) Cognitive coping as the public trying to sort out a way of thinking or
interpreting the meaning of the crisis with regard to their well-being, which
Figure 1.
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corresponds to Lazarus’ concept of emotion-focused coping, aiming at changing
only the way the relationship is interpreted by the public.
Anchoring these two coping strategies to the axis, different primary public in different
crises may choose different coping strategy along this continuum. Therefore, this
X-axis consists of cognitive (reappraisal of emotions) and behavioral (problem-solving)
efforts to manage specific external or internal demands (and conflicts between them)
that are appraised as exceeding the resources of the public.
On the Y-axis is the level of organizational engagement, ranging from high to low.
Jin et al. (2007) defined high organizational engagement as intense, consolidated,
sustained, and high priority in allocation of resources to deal with the crisis; on the
contrary, low organizational engagement does not mean cursory or no engagement, but
that the organization devotes comparatively less resources, effort, and energy to deal
with the crisis, either because the organization recognizes there is little it can do, or when
the organization did not cause the crisis, it is depending on external help, like a
regulatory agency, to help it resolve the crisis.
The two axes further form four quadrants in the crisis matrix: Quadrant 1 (high
engagement/conative coping), Quadrant 2 (high engagement/cognitive coping), Quadrant
3 (low engagement/cognitive coping), and Quadrant 4 (low engagement/conative coping).
In each of the quadrants is the dominant emotions (primary and secondary), based on the
confluence, interactions, and inter-relations of the publics’ coping strategy as well as
organizational engagement.
In this study, which is the first of empirical tests to examine the theoretical and practical
rigors of our model, we focused on testing the X-axis, the coping continuum of Quadrant 1
(high engagement/conative coping): anger is fueled, and abated, by the organization’s high
engagement. On the immediate level, the public may feel angry because they held
the organization responsible. On the secondary level, they may feel anxious when they
feel the organization is not doing enough. The conative coping strategy is driven by action
tendency, the feeling that the public can, and must do something about the situation.
Given the proposed attributes of crises in this quadrant, we seek to understand,
through the five cases:
RQ1. What are the primary emotions displayed by the primary public?
According to Lazarus (1991), after the evaluation of one’s options and resources for
coping with the situation, decision on future prospects needs to be made such as
whether action is required, and if so, what kind of action ought to be taken. In a crisis
situation, blaming takes precedence over credits. The coping potential, and future
expectancy, specify any given action the public or the organization might take to
prevent harm, and how it manages the demands of the crisis situation, and whether the
strategy is feasible, and what result is expected. Thus, we seek to examine:
RQ2. What coping strategies are evident in the primary public? What, if any, is the
difference in perception of the degree of the public’s coping strategy between
the organization and the public?
2.3 Organizational stance and strategies
Cancel et al. (1997) first introduced the notion of organizational stance in the contingency
theory of strategic conflict management. Stances were measured through a continuum
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from advocacy to accommodation. Between the two ends were a wide range of
operational stances and these entailed different degrees of advocacy and
accommodation (Cameron et al., 2008). Jin and Cameron (2006) further developed a
scale measuring stance as degree of action-based accommodation and qualified-rhetoric-
mixed accommodation. Within an organization, the contingency theory had identified
more than 80 variables, categorized into 11 themes, which could affect stance movement
along the continuum (Cameron et al., 2008). One’s stance necessarily affects one’s
strategies (Pang, 2006). Coombs (1998) alluded to a natural integration of stance and
strategy. Using terms that are synonymous with contingency theory’s stance, Coombs
(1998) argued that an organization’s reaction to conflict might vary from defensive to
accommodation. Defensive strategies include attack the accuser, denial, excuse, and
justification, while accommodative strategies include ingratiation, corrective action, and
full apology.
To study the full range of advocacy or accommodation undertaken by the
organization towards its public and vice versa based on the understanding of primary
publics’ emotions, we have adapted Coombs’ (1998) crisis communication strategies
into the contingency framework, and extend our study to examine:
RQ3. What stance (action-based versus qualified-rhetoric) did the organizations
take towards its primary public? What contingent factor appears to influence
this stance? How does this affect the strategy used?
3. Method
We attempted to understand the veracity and rigor of the ICM model through content
analyses of crisis cases. Case studies allow the researcher to delve into and explain, the
uniqueness and complexity of organizational processes, and as Gummesson (2000)
argued, to capture the essential processes of decision-making, implementation, and
change. The purpose of case studies is to empirically investigate a “contemporary
phenomenon within its real-life context” and address a “situation in which the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1993, p. 59).
In this study, we adopt a multiple case study design within the same phenomenon, with
the primary interest of understanding how the ICM model works. The cases are thus
studied for their instrumental value rather than intrinsic value (Stake, 1998). Though the
cases are analyzed in detail, contexts examined, and activities explored, these play
supporting roles to the researchers’ objectives, which are to facilitate understanding of
how relevant they are to the model. Consequently, by applying the method on five
disparately managed cases, Yin (1993, p. 64) argued, is an appropriate initial attempt at
theory testing, with the aim of building “analytic generalizations” (Yin, 2003, p. 33) from
the conceptualization.
Kaid (1996) argued that analyses of crisis events through media coverage are
well-trodden paths taken by researchers. Owing to the rapidity, abruptness, and
volatility in each of the crises, and the exigency and imperativeness to respond to the
crisis, both on the organizational as well as the publics’ side as rapidly as possible,
analysis of news coverage is argued to provide, to a large extent, an expeditious, fair,
and present representation of the crisis. For instance, Carey (2003, p. 6), in analyzing
the uses of media in reporting the 9/11 crisis, had described media reportage of the
crisis as “robust”. Journalism, in its purest form, is capturing and recording history in
the making, and we argue that studying news coverage is one way to capture the
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unfolding drama of the crises. Indeed, previous works analyzing crises through media
coverage had proved insightful. For instance, Reber et al. (2003) examined the dynamics
of a hostile takeover using media sources. Jin et al. (2006), Pang et al. (2004), and Meng
and Berger (2008) examined how governments managed health crises by analyzing
prestige newspapers, which was the forum of public discourse between the governments
and respective public during the crises. Shin et al. (2005) examined the life cycle and
resolution of high profile conflicts as evidence in the news coverage, which revealed the
high relevance and meaningfulness of the integration of journalistic conflict coverage
and PR process representation. Our rationale is that with every quick turn of events
during the crisis, the media, particularly the prestige newspapers, would be at the
forefront of reporting the crisis. Even though there might be some elements of bias and
subjectivity in some of these news reports, we believe that prestige newspapers, as
argued by Krippendorff (2004) and Riffe et al. (1998), would project a fair representation
of what had happened. Noll (2003, p. 18) argued that media content may be studied to
“verify assumptions of content”, and we argue that in our verification of content, we had
examined beyond media framing to distilling to its fundamental forms what were the
key ingredients in each crisis with the primary goal of shedding light to our model, not to
prove or disprove media biases. The intention was not just to capture the rapidly
unfolding communication between the organizations and their public as enumerated in
documents of public record. The study of each of the crises was centered on the height of
the crisis, i.e. the first month(s) of the crisis.
3.1 Sample
Five crises that matched the crisis types are selected based on the suggestions of a
group of PR practitioners and educators. Shin et al. (2005) found this to be a viable way
of identifying the appropriate crises to analyze. The five cases are: Hewlett Packard
(HP) case, an example of reputational damage; Dell’s battery recall, an example of
technological breakdown; the Sago mining crisis, an example of industrial crisis; Ford
Motors’ job cuts, an example of labor unrest/protest; and Military Commissions Act of
2006, an example of regulatory/legislative minefield.
Data to examine Quadrant 1 of the ICM model comes from content analyses of the
population of stories published in the largest circulating and widely influential national
newspapers, USA Today, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and
Washington Post (Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2006; Viguerie and Franke, 2004). News
stories in the five major newspapers (n ¼ 259)[2] were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by
typing in the keywords of the organization and the crisis. News stories were excluded if:
. there was no comment made by a spokesperson from the respective organization
or official from the organization or no mention of any official communication
from the organization; or
. the stories were in the same publication or there was no mention of the crisis. The
respective organizations’ web sites were accessed to analyze their official
announcements through press releases.
However, as such information were not available in two of the five cases, namely the
Ford Motors and Military Commissions Act 2006 cases, the authors decided to analyze
only media coverage for all cases for more comparable analyses (see Appendix for
the details of the cases).
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3.2 Coding instrument
The unit of analysis is defined as a news story. This includes stories by the staff of the
newspaper and wire stories from the editors. The 259 stories were coded for the
following variables:
3.2.1 Primary public’s coping strategy. First, primary public’s willingness to change
their opinion of the crisis (cognitive coping) was measured on a seven-point Likert like
scale, where 1 was “not evident”. Specifically, 1 stands for “Public is not willing to
change its perception of the crisis, e.g. the crisis is what it is and there is no need to
explain it further or change the angle of looking at it”; 2 stands for “Public mentions
examining the crisis further without detailed plan or explanation”; 3 stands for “Public
tries slightly different ways to explain the crisis, but essentially it keeps the same
perspective on the crisis”; 4 stands for “Public remains neutral and does not seem to be
willing, nor unwilling, to address the crisis”; 5 stands for “Public is willing to readdress
the crisis from different perspective”; 6 stands for “Public is proactive in re-addressing
the crisis, providing different angles and explanations of what happened”; and 7 stands
for “Public is extremely proactive in taking another look at the crisis and providing full
explanation on the new perception”.
Second, primary public’s willingness to take actions to address the crisis (conative
coping) was measured on a seven-point Likert like scale, where 1 was “not evident”, and 7
was “very evident”). The same set of coping strategy variables were also measured from
the organization’s perspective as evidenced in the news stories. Specifically, 1 stands for
“Public is not willing to take any action regarding the crisis”; 2 stands for “Public
mentions the possibility of taking measures to address the crisis, without detailed plan”;
3 stands for “Public tries slightly different ways to change the crisis situation, but
essentially it keeps the status quo with little identifiable action”; 4 stands for “Public
remains neutral and does not seem to be willing, nor unwilling, to take actions to change
the crisis situation”; 5 stands for “Public is willing take planned actions to address the
crisis”; 6 stands for “Public is proactive in planning steps of actions to fight against the
crisis”; and 7 stands for “Public is extremely proactive in taking actions with detailed
plans against the crisis”.
3.2.2 Public’s emotion expressed (from a list of sadness, fright, anger, and sadness).
Primary emotion and secondary emotion were measured on a seven-point Likert like
scale, where 1 was “not evident (no trace of display of emotion)”, and 7 was “very
evident (vivid and graphic description of facial expression of the public and direct
quote on the emotion expressed)”, scoring the highest and second highest among other
negative emotions, respectively.
We captured the four emotions by noting their presence or absence expressed in news
reports by the primary public, and if they were present, to what extent were they evident.
We base our assumption that news stories should capture comments from not just the
organization in crisis, but also the people affected by the crisis with the primary public as
a major stakeholder. Thus, for a story that reports on how an organization is managing
the situation, we assume that reporters would at the same time seek the views of the
victims’ families or employees. In our codebook, we measure emotion expressed
according to the following way:
. 1: No trace of display of emotion.
. 2: Denial of emotion or denying it was affecting them.
Integrated
crisis
mapping
437
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 S
in
ga
po
re
 M
an
ag
em
en
t U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 A
t 2
3:
02
 2
3 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
20
19
 (P
T)
. 3: Mention the (specific) emotion, with little description and elaboration of the
said emotion.
. 4: Declaration of how they feel and display of emotion.
. 5: Description of the emotion of the public.
. 6: Direct quote on the emotion expressed by the public.
. 7: Vivid and graphic description of facial expression of the public, and direct
quote on the emotion expressed.
. 99: Emotion not mentioned in the story.
3.2.3 Organizational stance. Items from Jin and Cameron’s (2006) stance inventory were
used to examine two clusters of stances as degree of accommodation, on a seven-point
Likert-like scale, with 1 as “not evident” and 7 as “very evident”:
(1) The organization takes action-based stance towards the public (the organization
seems willing to: yield to the public’s demands; or agree to follow what the
public proposed; or accept the publics’ propositions; or agree with the public on
future action or procedure; or agree to try the solutions suggested by the public;
or any combination of these).
(2) The organization takes qualified-rhetoric-mixed stance towards the public
(the organization seems willing to: express regret or apologized to the public; or
collaborate with the public in order to solve the problem at hand; or change its
own position towards that of the public; or make concessions with the public; or
admit wrongdoing; or any combination of these).
3.2.4 Dominant contingent factor. Dominant contingent factor that drives the
organization’s stance with regards to its public was identified, using the matrix of
contingent factors as: external threats, industry environment, general political/social
environment/external culture, external public, issue under question, organization’s
characteristics, influence of PR practitioners, influence of dominant coalition, internal
threats, individual characteristics, and relationship characteristics.
3.2.5 Primary crisis response strategy. Primary crisis response strategy was coded
according to the crisis response strategies by level of responsibility acceptance: attack,
denial, excuse, justification, ingratiation, corrective action, and full apology.
3.2.6 Message attributes. The overall attributes of crisis communication response
messages were measured on three continuums, using a seven-point Likert-type scale:
(1) defense-accommodation continuum, with 1 as “defensive” and 7 as
“accommodative”;
(2) ambiguity-specification continuum, with 1 as “ambiguous” and 7 as “specific”; and
(3) emotion-cognition continuum, with 1 as “emotional” and 7 as “factual”.
3.3 Coders and training
Two coders, both graduate students and familiar with the content analysis method,
conducted the coding. With the help of a codebook, the coders were given detailed
instruction and description of the various categories used and defined in the coding
instrument. Sufficient measures have been taken (Krippendorff, 2004) to ensure that the
inter-coder reliability achieved was the result of extensive training before the pretest,
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followed by pretest. Two practice sessions were held in December 2006 using a
randomly-selected 10 percent of the samples of stories to familiarize with the coding
instruments. The coders worked independently and were not allowed to consult with
each other about the coding. The results were discussed and the disagreements were
resolved, which were also reflected in the revision and adjustment of the codebook. After
multiple training sessions, based on the 10 percent of the story sample at the final coding
pretest, the inter-coder reliability across all coding items achieved 0.84 using Scott’s Pi.
Before the coders proceeded with the rest of the coding, the remaining disagreements
were discussed and the common understanding of the coding items was established.
Thereafter, the two coders split the rest of the story sample and finished the rest of the
coding separately within a week, based on a well-established satisfactory inter-coder
reliability during the development and refinement of the codebook.
4. Results
4.1 Primary emotions
RQ1 examined the primary emotions displayed by the primary public, as evidenced in
the news coverage. For HP case, anger was displayed as the primary emotion
(M ¼ 2.22, SD ¼ 1.40, n ¼ 58) while anxiety as secondary emotion (M ¼ 2.09,
SD ¼ 1.30, n ¼ 57). Sadness (M ¼ 1.12, SD ¼ 0.53, n ¼ 58) and fright (M ¼ 1.10,
SD ¼ 0.45, n ¼ 58) were also evident in the news coverage. Anger and anxiety were
highly correlated (r(56) ¼ 0.63, p , 0.001). For Dell case, anger was displayed as the
primary emotion (M ¼ 3.17, SD ¼ 2.08, n ¼ 12) while anxiety as secondary emotion
(M ¼ 2.50, SD ¼ 1.68, n ¼ 12). Sadness (M ¼ 1.67, SD ¼ 1.23, n ¼ 12) and fright
(M ¼ 1.00, SD ¼ 0.00, n ¼ 12) were also evident in the news coverage. However, anger
and anxiety were not significantly correlated (r(9) ¼ 0.26, ns).
For Sago Mine case, anxiety was displayed as the primary emotion (M ¼ 4.48,
SD ¼ 2.06, n ¼ 25) while sadness as secondary emotion (M ¼ 3.20, SD ¼ 2.00, n ¼ 25).
Anger (M ¼ 2.96, SD ¼ 2.01, n ¼ 25) and fright (M ¼ 2.92, SD ¼ 1.80, n ¼ 25) were
also evident in the news coverage. There were two identifiable “other emotions” (“joy”
and “hope”, occurred three times and once, respectively). Anxiety and sadness were
highly correlated (r(23) ¼ 0.60, p , 0.01), and there was significant difference in terms of
how evident they were in the news coverage (t(24) ¼ 3.53, p , 0.01)[3].
For Ford case, anxiety was displayed as the primary emotion (M ¼ 4.17, SD ¼ 1.49,
n ¼ 35) while sadness as secondary emotion (M ¼ 2.63, SD ¼ 1.72, n ¼ 35). Anger
(M ¼ 1.69, SD ¼ 1.08, n ¼ 35) and fright (M ¼ 2.23, SD ¼ 1.59, n ¼ 35) were also
evident in the news coverage. Anxiety and sadness were highly correlated (r(33) ¼ 0.75,
p , 0.001), and there was significant difference in terms of how evident they were in the
news coverage (t(34) ¼ 7.96, p , 0.001).
For the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) immigration case leading to the Military
Commissions Act 2006, anxiety was displayed as the primary emotion (M ¼ 2.38,
SD ¼ 1.42, n ¼ 47) while anger as secondary emotion (M ¼ 2.02, SD ¼ 1.47, n ¼ 47).
Sadness (M ¼ 1.04, SD ¼ 0.29, n ¼ 47) and fright (M ¼ 1.04, SD ¼ 0.29, n ¼ 47) were
also evident in the news coverage. Anxiety and sadness were significantly correlated
(r(45) ¼ 0.41, p , 0.01).
4.2 Primary publics’ coping strategies
RQ2 examined the primary publics’ coping strategies, as evident in the news coverage.
For HP case, the primary public tended to use more conative coping (M ¼ 5.14,
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SD ¼ 1.09, n ¼ 59) than cognitive coping (M ¼ 4.53, SD ¼ 1.19, n ¼ 59) (t(58) ¼ 3.85,
p , 0.001). For Dell case, there is no significant difference in its primary publics’
coping strategy preference. For Sago Mine case, the primary public tended to use more
conative coping (M ¼ 4.79, SD ¼ 0.78, n ¼ 24) than cognitive coping (M ¼ 3.96,
SD ¼ 1.33, t(23) ¼ 2.78, p , 0.05). For Ford case, the primary public tended to use
more conative coping (M ¼ 4.64, SD ¼ 0.96, n ¼ 33) than cognitive coping (M ¼ 4.27,
SD ¼ 1.21, n ¼ 33) (t(32) ¼ 2.43, p , 0.05). For the CIA immigration case, the primary
public tended to use more conative coping (M ¼ 5.40, SD ¼ 0.65, n ¼ 47) than
cognitive coping (M ¼ 4.74, SD ¼ 1.13, n ¼ 47) (t(46) ¼ 4.70, p , 0.001). Except for
the case involving Dell, the primary public in all the other cases were more willing to
take actions to address the crisis than to change their opinion of the crisis.
In terms of the perception of the degree of the publics’ coping strategy in between
the organization and the public, for the HP and CIA immigration cases, the primary
public were more willing to take cognitive coping (HP case: M ¼ 4.53, SD ¼ 1.20,
n ¼ 58; CIA immigration case: M ¼ 4.74, SD ¼ 1.13, n ¼ 47) than the organization (HP
case: M ¼ 3.86, SD ¼ 1.26, n ¼ 58; CIA immigration case: M ¼ 3.98, SD ¼ .99, n ¼ 47)
(HP case: t(57) ¼ 3.13, p , 0.01; CIA immigration case: t(46) ¼ 4.07, p , 0.001)
perceived it to be. The primary public were also more willing to take conative coping
(HP case: M ¼ 5.14, SD ¼ 1.09, n ¼ 59; CIA immigration case: M ¼ 5.40, SD ¼ 0.65,
n ¼ 47) than the organization (HP case: M ¼ 4.46, SD ¼ 1.33, n ¼ 59; CIA immigration
case: M ¼ 4.91, SD ¼ 1.20, n ¼ 47) (HP case: t(58) ¼ 3.44, p , 0.01; CIA immigration
case: t(46) ¼ 2.49, p , 0.05) perceived it to be. It seems that the primary public in these
two cases were more active than the organizations in taking efforts to change opinions
and the crisis situations.
For Dell and Ford cases, there was no significant difference in the cognitive coping
strategy taking between the primary public and the organization (Dell case: t(10) ¼ 1.48,
ns; Ford case: t(32) ¼ 1.44, ns). Interestingly, the organizations in both cases were more
willing to take conative coping (Dell case: M ¼ 5.92, SD ¼ 0.80, n ¼ 11; Ford case:
M ¼ 5.44, SD ¼ 0.9, n ¼ 33) than the primary public (Dell case: M ¼ 4.17, SD ¼ 1.19,
n ¼ 11; Ford case: M ¼ 4.63, SD ¼ 0.98, n ¼ 33) (Dell case: t(10) ¼ 3.78, p , 0.01; Ford
case: t(32) ¼ 3.66, p , 0.01). It seems that these two organizations are more active than
the primary public demand in taking efforts to change opinions about the crisis
situations.
For Sago Mine case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive and conative
coping strategies taking between the primary public and the organization (t(23) ¼ 1.48,
ns; t(23) ¼ 1.00, ns, respectively).
4.3 Organizational stance and strategy
RQ3 examined the stance taken by the organizations towards their primary public, the
factors influencing this stance, and the strategy used. For HP and Ford cases, more
qualified-rhetoric-mixed accommodation was taken (HP case: M ¼ 4.55, SD ¼ 0.863,
n ¼ 82; Ford case: M ¼ 4.97, SD ¼ 0.674, n ¼ 67) than action-based accommodation
(HP case: M ¼ 4.37, SD ¼ 0.882, n ¼ 82; Ford case: M ¼ 4.66, SD ¼ 0.729, n ¼ 67) (HP
case: t(81) ¼ 3.312, p , 0.01; Ford case: t(66) ¼ 4.218, p , 0.001). For HP case, the
influence of dominant coalition (31.7 percent), external threats (25.6 percent), and
influence of PR practitioners (24.3 percent) were the dominant contingent factors
(x 2 (36, n ¼ 259) ¼ 263.289, p , 0.001) appeared to influence these stances. For Dell,
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Sago Mine and the CIA immigration cases, there was no significant difference in terms
of the two types of stance. The factors in the Dell case appeared to be relationship
characteristics (40.0 percent), issue under question (15.0 percent), influence of
dominant coalition (15.0 percent), and individual characteristics (15.0 percent)
(x 2 (36, n ¼ 259) ¼ 263.289, p , 0.001). For Sago mining case, influence of dominant
coalition (40.7 percent), relationship characteristics (22.2 percent), and external public
(14.8 percent) were the dominant contingent factors (x 2 (36, n ¼ 259) ¼ 263.289,
p , 0.001). For Ford case, industry environment (26.1 percent), internal threats (24.6
percent), and influence of dominant coalition (18.8 percent) were the dominant contingent
factors (x 2 (36, n ¼ 259) ¼ 263.289, p , 0.001). For CIA immigration case, influence of
dominant coalition (49.2 percent) and organization’s characteristics (29.5 percent) were
the dominant contingent factors (x 2 (36, n ¼ 259) ¼ 263.289, p , 0.001).
Across the five cases, more qualified-rhetoric-mixed accommodation was taken
(M ¼ 4.63, SD ¼ 0.830) than action-based accommodation (M ¼ 4.50, SD ¼ 0.840,
n ¼ 256) (t(255) ¼ 3.616, p , 0.001). Across the five cases, different contingent factors
seemed to make a significant difference in both degrees of action-based accommodation
(F(9, 247) ¼ 3.812, p , 0.001) and qualified-rhetoric-mixed accommodation
(F(9, 247) ¼ 3.801, p , 0.001). Post hoc Scheffe tests were used to examine the
difference between the contingent factors: on one hand, external threats led to
significantly ( p , 0.05) higher degrees of action-based accommodation (M ¼ 4.96,
SD ¼ 0.720, n ¼ 26) than the influence of PR practitioners did (M ¼ 4.00, SD ¼ 0.764,
n ¼ 25). On the other hand, eternal threats also led to significantly higher degrees of
qualified-rhetoric-mixed accommodation (M ¼ 5.08, SD ¼ 0.744, n ¼ 26) than the
internal threats (M ¼ 5.08. SD ¼ 0.717, n ¼ 24; p , 0.05), and the influence of PR
practitioners (M ¼ 4.12, SD ¼ 0.881, n ¼ 25; p , 0.05) did.
For the strategies used, for HP case, justification (35.5 percent), ingratiation (21.0
percent), corrective action (17.7 percent), and excuse (16.1 percent) were the primary
crisis strategies (x 2 (24, n ¼ 220) ¼ 132.104, p , 0.001). For Dell case, corrective action
(70.0 percent), justification (15.0 percent), and ingratiation (15.0 percent) were the
primary crisis strategies (x 2 (24, N ¼ 220) ¼ 132.104, p , 0.001). For Sago mining case,
excuse (33.3 percent), corrective action (22.2 percent), justification (18.5 percent), and
ingratiation (18.5 percent) were the primary crisis strategies (x 2 (24, n ¼ 220) ¼ 132.104,
p , 0.001). For Ford case, corrective action (46.8 percent) and ingratiation (41.9 percent)
were the primary crisis strategies (x 2 (24, n ¼ 220) ¼ 132.104, p , 0.001). For CIA
immigration case, ingratiation (73.5 percent) and justification (24.5 percent) were the
primary crisis strategies (x 2 (24, n ¼ 220) ¼ 132.104, p , 0.001). Across the five cases,
the primary crisis strategies (excuse, justification, ingratiation, and corrective action)
had significant influence on three message attribute continuums (defensive-
accommodative, F(6, 212) ¼ 24.305, p , 0.001; ambiguous-specific, F(6, 209) ¼ 6.207,
p , 0.001; and emotional-factual, F(6, 205) ¼ 3.212, p , 0.01).
Post hoc Scheffe tests were used to examine the difference between the four primary
crisis strategies. For defensive-accommodative message attribute: excuse (M ¼ 3.14,
SD ¼ 0.573, n ¼ 21) led to significantly more defensive message attributes than
other crisis strategies did (i.e. ingratiation, M ¼ 4.16, SD ¼ 0.793, n ¼ 82, p , 0.01;
corrective action, M ¼ 5.17, SD ¼ 1.224, n ¼ 60; p , 0.001). Justification (M ¼ 3.56,
SD ¼ 0.796, n ¼ 48) led to significantly more defensive message attributes than
other crisis strategies did (i.e. ingratiation, M ¼ 4.16, SD ¼ 0.793, n ¼ 82, p , 0.05;
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corrective action, M ¼ 5.17, SD ¼ 1.224, n ¼ 60, p , 0.001). Corrective action
(M ¼ 5.17, SD ¼ 1.224, n ¼ 60) led to significantly more accommodative message
attributes than other crisis strategies did (i.e. excuse, M ¼ 3.14, SD ¼ 0.573, n ¼ 21,
p , 0.001; justification, M ¼ 3.56, SD ¼ 0.796, n ¼ 48, p , 0.001; ingratiation,
M ¼ 4.16, SD ¼ 0.793, n ¼ 82, p , 0.001). For ambiguous-specific message attributes,
excuse (M ¼ 3.62, SD ¼ 1.284, n ¼ 21) was found to be significantly more ambiguous
than ingratiation (M ¼ 4.74, SD ¼ 0.909, n ¼ 81; p , 0.01) and corrective action
(M ¼ 4.92, SD ¼ 1.134, n ¼ 59; p , 0.01). For emotional-factual message attributes,
corrective action (M ¼ 5.14, SD ¼ 1.249, n ¼ 58) was found to be significantly more
factual than attack (M ¼ 2.00, SD ¼ 1.414, n ¼ 2; p , 0.10).
5. Discussion
The findings were distilled into two categories: what the evidence suggests as strong
merit; and what the evidence suggests as some merit. Implications of the evidence were
drawn, with suggestions to refine the ICM model (Figure 2).
5.1 Publics’ emotional response: new variations of emotions
In crises which required high organizational engagement, and conative coping by the
public, the ICM model posited the existence of two emotions: anger as the primary level
emotion where the public experience at the first or immediate instance; and anxiety as
the secondary level emotion where the public experience in subsequent instances. The
secondary level emotion may be transferred from the dominant emotion or coexisting
with the primary level. This paper finding showed that anger and anxiety were evident
in three of the five cases. Of the three, two showed that it was associated or co-existed
with the other. Of the two emotions posited, anxiety was evident in all the cases
studied, mostly as primary level emotion while anger was present in three of the five
cases, either as primary or secondary level emotions. Another emotion, which we had
posited in another quadrant, sadness, was evident in two of the five cases. Regardless
of what the emotional combinations were (anger-anxiety, anxiety-anger,
anger-sadness, anxiety-sadness), in four of the five cases, our findings found a high
likelihood that one emotion co-existed with the other. Though anxiety is found to be
evident in all five cases, it could not be said with certainty that anxiety was the more
powerful or dominant of the two emotions. Evidence, thus, suggests strong merit in the
Figure 2.
Revised first quadrant
of ICM model
Reputational damage
Technological breakdown
Industrial matters
Labor unrest/protest
Regulation/legislation
Public's conative coping
Anxiety
Anger/sadness
Organizational
engagement
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existence of three variants of emotions (anger, anxiety, and sadness), instead of two
(anger and anxiety), in this quadrant. Evidence also suggests some merit that there
may not be a distinction between primary and secondary level emotions, but that these
emotions are often intertwined and interwoven with one another.
5.2 Publics’ coping strategy: evidence of conative coping
In this quadrant, our ICM model had posited that the public engaged more in conative
than cognitive coping. In conative coping, we argued that the public try to manage the
situation so as to alter a troubled relationship or to sustain a desirable one by taking
actions or at least show their tendency of action. On the contrary, in cognitive coping,
we argue that the public try to sort out a way of thinking or interpreting the meaning of
the crisis with regard to their well-being. Findings showed that as far as the public were
concerned, in four of the five cases, they engaged in conative coping and regarded their
own abilities and willingness to take action to change their perception of the crisis
situation. Consequently, findings also showed that because they were willing to take
proactive steps to deal with the crises on their ends, these public expected, in two of the
five cases, the organizations to do likewise and similarly engage in conative coping
strategies to deal with the crises. Evidence thus suggests strong merit in the conative
coping strategies of the primary public in crises relating to reputation, technological
breakdown, labor unrest, industrial matters, and regulation and legislation.
5.3 Qualified rhetoric-mixed stance rather than action-based stance
The evidence provides support for the idea that organizations embroiled in the types of
crises identified in this quadrant engaged in qualified rhetoric-mixed stance towards
their primary public rather than action-based stance. In the former, the organization is
willing to express regret and apologize to the public, to collaborate with the public, to
make concessions, or to admit wrongdoing. In the latter, the organization is willing to
yield to the public’s demands, accept the public’s propositions, and agree to the public’s
suggestion for solution. The former, as the name suggests, contains more rhetoric or
posturing by the organization, and may or may not lead to action that supports
the rhetoric. The latter promises concrete action by the organization, in accordance to the
public’s demands, to resolve the situation. Therefore, saying what one is willing to do is
only tantamount to posturing, or qualified rhetoric-mixed stance. Saying what one will
do is an indication of action-based stance.
The factors, as identified by the contingency theory, that appeared to influence this
stance were threats (external and internal), followed by the involvement of PR
practitioners. Contingency theory argued that three sets of variables, predisposing,
situational, and proscriptive, influence organizational stance. Predisposing variables are
factors that influence the organization on the continuum before it enters into a particular
situation involving a public. Situational variables are factors that are most likely to
influence how an organization relates to its public by effecting shifts from a predisposed
stance along the continuum during an interaction. Proscriptive variables prohibit the
organization from engaging in any accommodative stance with its public. In this study,
threats, which is a well-supported situational variable in the contingency theory
(Cameron et al., 2008) appeared to have a stronger influence on organizational stance
than the involvement of PR practitioners, a factor identified as a predisposing variable
(Cameron et al., 2008).
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Evidence suggests that collectively, both the internal and external threats seemed to
exert such a strong influence on the organizations’ assumption of a qualified rhetoric-
mixed stance that any attempt by the PR practitioners to engage a more action-based
stance with the organizations’ public, a stance they often assume (Choi and Cameron,
2005; Pang et al., 2006; Reber and Cameron, 2003; Yarbrough et al., 1998), was not
sufficient to alter the eventual stance adopted. This supports Cameron et al.’s (2001)
assertion that situational variables can prove to be compelling and powerful enough to
posit the organizational stance even though the organization may have assumed an
initial predisposed stance.
5.4 Mixed strategies: defensive and ambiguous versus accommodative and factual
Four common strategies by organizations embroiled in crises were identified in this
quadrant: excuse, justification, ingratiation, and corrective action. Excuse and
justification are reflective of the defensive stance whereas ingratiation and corrective
action are indicative of an accommodative stance. It is no surprise that mixed strategies
are used given the finding that the organizations maintained the crises did not relate to or
affect their operations or reputations, nor did they think they were fully responsible for
the crises. Interestingly, evidence offers some merit that when organizations become
defensive while assuming the qualified rhetoric-mixed stance, they use the strategy of
excuse to send out a message that is more ambiguous than specific. Conversely, in times
when they are more accommodative while assuming the qualified rhetoric-mixed stance,
they use the strategy of corrective action to send out a message that is more factual than
emotional.
This mixed bag of strategies lends further support to earlier findings that the public
did not attribute crisis responsibility to the organizations. At the same time, it does
appear that in some ways, the organizations use these strategies to reinforce the public
perception that the organizations are not responsible for the crises. Lee (2004) argued
that in cases when public are more critical of the organizations and attribute more
organizational responsibility, this may signal organizational guilt. Heath and Coombs
(2006) argued that excuse and justification belonged to the cluster of strategies called
diminish strategies, which is an attempt to minimize organizational responsibility while
ingratiation could be construed as the organization’s attempt to reinforce its status and
relationship with its public. Additionally, based on Coombs’ (1995) categorization of
response strategies based on crisis types, with three of the five crises examined here
belonging to the “intentional” category that involves “transgression” (Ford, HP, and CIA
cases) and two of the five crises examined here belonging to the “unintentional” category
involving “faux pas” and “accidents” (Dell and Sago Mine cases), ingratiation and
justification are viable strategies to employ to maintain the delicate balance of engaging
the public while distancing the organizations from guilt and responsibility.
5.5 Strategic holding position: relevance to practitioners
The evidence provides support for the idea that the organizations view their strategies as
effective and the public regard organizational responses as acceptable. This provide
further support for earlier findings that the public in these crises engaged in conative
coping, where they did their best to manage the situation so as to alter a troubled
relationship or to sustain a desirable one by taking actions or showed their tendency of
action, compared to the more passive cognitive coping, where the public try to sort out
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a way of thinking or interpreting the meaning of the crisis with regard to their well-being.
Similarly, the public also did not think the organizations were fully responsible for
the crises.
Though, the crisis literature has continually emphasized the need for candid, swift,
and accurate dissemination of information by organizations during crises, this study
shows that it need not always be the case. Stanton (2002, p. 20) argued that organizations
always fell into the “easy trap” of “treating every difficulty as if it were a crisis”. Ulmer
and Sellnow (2000) furthered the concept of strategic ambiguity in crisis communication,
where some crisis situations prohibit organizations from engaging in the precise
dissemination of messages. What we have uncovered in this study is evidence to support
the idea of a “strategic holding position”, a situation where organizations are able to
assume a qualified rhetoric-mixed stance, galvanized by a neutral yet a common enemy
of collective threat ( Jin et al., 2006), and consequently, utilizing a mixed bag of strategies
ranging from defensive strategies like excuse and justification as well as accommodative
strategies like ingratiation and corrective action, to engage their public. The result: the
public found the organizations’ strategies acceptable, and the organizations were
satisfied with the effectiveness of their strategies.
However, we qualify that since this study examined up to the first month of each
crisis, practitioners can only adopt a strategic holding position for a restricted period of
time and under certain conditions. One can assume this position as long as the public
adopted:
. conative coping;
. the public did not think the organizations were fully responsible for the crises;
and
. the crisis is still at its infancy.
Over time, practitioners should likely shift position to reach out to the public. Coombs
(2007) recommended two ways, form and content recommendations. Form
recommendations meant engaging in open, prompt, and consistent communication.
Content recommendation focused on providing more concrete information through
instructing information; and more assurance to help public cope through adjusting
information. Seeger (2006, p. 241) argued practitioners should not shy away from
showing compassion, concern, and empathy “for fear of appearing unprofessional”.
Interestingly, this study did not show any evidence of the employment of denial and
mortification strategies, both extreme ends of the continuum. Denial often arouses the
suspicion of wrongdoing while mortification signals the acceptance of wrongdoing,
strategies the organizations did not employ because they did not accept responsibility
and guilt in the first place.
6. Conclusion: what next?
Arguably, scant attention has been paid in the crisis literature to understand the
emotions of the public in crisis, whether crises involving reputation (Ihlen, 2002;
Johnson and Peppas, 2003; Puchan, 2001); labor unrest (Crandall and Menefee, 1996); or
technological breakdown (Benoit and Brinson, 1994; Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997), and
what organizational strategies can be used to respond to the public. Yet, it is our thesis
that studies analyzing audience reception in crises should increasingly dominate crisis
scholarship for the simple argument that organizational strategies would be ineffectual
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if these do not appeal to the hearts and minds of the public the organizations are trying
to reach. The ICM model is positioned as a nascent attempt to understand crisis from
the perspectives of the public so that organizational strategies and responses can be
more appropriately targeted and honed. Both organizations and their public respond
not only intellectually, but emotionally, to the events around them that shape the
reputation and future of their own lives to a greater or a lesser extent.
Based on this first stage of the testing of the ICM model, we are able to offer testable
propositions: that public involved in crises pertaining to reputational damage,
technological breakdown, industrial matters, labor unrest, and regulation/legislation,
are likely to feel anxious, angry, and sad. At the same time, they are likely to engage in
conative coping and take active steps to restore some semblance of normalcy within
their immediate environment.
This study has investigated the viability of the core of the ICM model, emotion, and
coping, by integrating crisis perspectives with psychological analyses. Organizational
engagement, defined by Jin et al. (2007) as the level of an organization’s crisis resource
allocation, crisis responsibility, and the crisis relevance to the organizational goals,
needs to be further explored and tested empirically. It is our hope that as we assiduously
test the theoretical rigor of each of the quadrants posited in the model, we would be able
to, over time, generate what Yin (2003, p. 33) termed “analytic generalization”. Analytic
generalization, or what Bennett (2004, p. 22) called “theory confirming and infirming”, is
achieved when “two or more cases” support the theoretical assertions (Yin, 2003, p. 33).
Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that the analyses are all based on media
reports; we relied on content analysis of media reports which are filtered through the
eyes of journalists who may frame issues according to their perceptions of what had
happened. As we had argued, due to the rapidity, abruptness, and volatility in each of the
crises, and the exigency and imperativeness to respond to the crisis, analysis of news
coverage would provide an expeditious and fair representation of what had happened as
in all of the cases, particularly as our studies often centered on the height of the crisis, i.e.
the first month(s) of the crisis. Studying news coverage is one way to capture the
unfolding drama of the crises. In our analysis, we took care to examine content beyond
media framing to distilling to its fundamental forms what were the key ingredients in
each crisis with the primary goal of shedding light to our model, not to prove or disprove
media biases. Besides, any potential media bias would have been detected and accounted
for by analyzing data from not one but five prestige newspapers. Even though
there might be some elements of bias, subjectivity, and negativity in some of these
news reports, we believe that analyzing prestige newspapers would project a fair
representation of what had happened (Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 1998). Our
intention was not just to capture the rapidly unfolding communication between the
organizations and their public as enumerated in documents of public record, we humbly
submit that the ongoing public discourse would reflect, to a large extent, an accurate and
present reading of the reality. Even with the inherent methodological limitations, these
limitations should not invalidate our findings.
Since this is part of an ongoing study exploring the viability of the model, it has
provided a fruitful exploratory area of research. Findings suggest theoretical rigor in the
model, with room for further refinements. Owing to the small sample size of codable
crisis stories, our results are exploratory and descriptive in nature. Our future research
would also use more in-depth case analysis approach to examine how individual crisis
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evolve, what was the level of organizational engagement, and how the public respond
emotionally. Also planned is the examination of messages disseminated through media
releases as well as interviews with practitioners and focus groups with public involved
in the respective crises. Analysis could dive into analyzing emotional expressions. These
emotions could then be validated and triangulated through interviews and experiments
so as validate the publics’ affective responses in a given crisis situation. We also hope to
triangulate the findings of our case analyses using experimental designs.
Notes
1. The authors would like to thank Timothy S. Penning of Grand Valley State University for
his suggestion of this term.
2. HP case (n ¼ 82); Dell’s battery recall (n ¼ 20); Sago mining crisis (n ¼ 27); Ford Motors’ job
cuts (n ¼ 69); and Military Commissions Act of 2006 (n ¼ 61).
3. All t-tests were conducted as paired samples test (two-tailed).
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Appendix. Summary of crisis cases selected for crisis types mapped in ICM
(Quadrant 1)
HP case. This is an example of reputational crisis. HP’s internal leak crisis became public
September 6, 2006 when the company filed documents with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Media coverage on the leak investigation lasted for months, but the articles analyzed
focused on coverage until September 22, 2006, the day that the chairwoman of the board Patricia
Dunn resigned.
Story collection. The populations of HP news stories were obtained from September 6-22, 2006.
News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words (HP, H-P and Hewlett
Packard). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 82.
Dell case. This is an example of technology breakdown. The crisis surrounding Dell’s battery
recall began on August 14, 2006 with the organization’s official announcement of the recall. The
recall was voluntary and lasted until September 29, 2006 when the company announced an update on
the situation. The majority of news coverage occurred during the first two weeks of the recall.
Story collection. The populations of Dell news stories were obtained from August 14 to
September 30, 2006, from the first official communication by Dell to one day after the last release
on the topic by Dell. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words
(Dell and battery). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 20.
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Sago mining case. This is an example of industrial matters. Media coverage of the Sago
Mining accident began on January 4, 2005 with the statement given by the mine’s owner ICG
Group Incorporation. The bulk of media coverage occurred from January 6 to 13, 2006.
Story collection. The population of stories was accessed from January 4 to February 1, 2006,
from the first official announcement from ICG to the last official statement by ICG on the crisis.
News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words (Sago mine and ICG).
Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 27.
Ford case. This is an example of labor unrest/protest. Media coverage of the Ford job cutback
crisis began on May 11, 2006, as newspapers reported on the mounting struggle of American
automobile producers to keep pace with foreign competitors. Coverage intensified in August and
September, following Ford’s announcements that it would implement massive production cuts
and manufacturing plant closings, as well as the buyout or layoff of tens of thousands of
workers, as part of a massive corporate restructuring plan.
Story collection. The population of Ford news stories were obtained from from May 10 to
September 20, 2006. The news stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key
words (Ford and jobs). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 69.
Military Commissions Act 2006. This is an example of regulation/deregulation. The CIA’s
crisis regarding the treatment of suspected terrorist conspirators imprisoned at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, began on July 12, 2006. Responding to allegations of physical torture and unethical
interrogation of detainees, American media questioned whether the constitutional rights of
prisoners should be extended to alleged terrorists held abroad. President Bush and his
administration acknowledged the existence of secret CIA prisons hosted by foreign
governments, but declined to confirm the exact locations of these facilities.
Story collection. The population of CIA releases and news stories were searched from July 12
to November 4, 2006. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words
(CIA and Guantanamo) and stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 61.
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